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1. Dan Cavedon-Taylor argues that our account of the distinctive epistemic value of photography conflates "two incompatible conceptions of epistemic value."​[1]​ On our account, photographs are distinctively valuable (1) because they provide visual information (v-information) about the objects they depict without providing information about the egocentric location of those objects with respect to the viewer (e-information), and (2) because of the categorical salience of photographs along with existence of common background beliefs about the information-carrying capacities of that category.​[2]​ Since our account of information-carrying is resolutely objective (i.e., mind-independent), Cavedon-Taylor suggests that the first condition implies a realist, or viewer-independent conception of epistemic value. But since the second condition is clearly mind-dependent, he claims that the conception of epistemic value to which it contributes conflicts with the earlier objective conception: "The problem here…is that what makes photographs epistemically valuable cannot be on the one hand, as (1) would suggest, some viewer independent feature they possess, but simultaneously be a viewer-dependent feature on the other, as is suggested by (2)."​[3]​
	We are puzzled by the charge that we are conflating incompatible conceptions of epistemic value. At no point do we argue for a conception of epistemic value that is entirely viewer-independent (nor, for that matter, do we argue for one that is viewer-dependent). Rather, we contend that the relevant form of epistemic value possessed by photographs arises from a combination of the viewer-dependent and viewer-independent. That is, there are both viewer-dependent and viewer-independent sources of epistemic value in this case. But to say this is not to present two distinct conceptions of epistemic value. So there is no inconsistency on our part.
	Is there some other reason to reject the idea that the epistemic value of photographs could be understood as arising from both viewer-dependent and viewer-independent sources? We don't see it. We take it that epistemic value (like artistic and moral value) is complex, and can be assessed along different dimensions. So, for example, a particular belief state might be thought to be epistemically valuable both because it is justified (plausibly a mind-dependent feature) and because it is true (a mind-independent feature). Why can't something similar be true of photographs?

2. Why believe that something similar is true of photographs?
	Cavedon-Taylor (section II) agrees with us that (1) represents one important epistemic value that photographs have: photographs serve one kind of epistemic need by carrying v-information, and by doing so even when nothing can (a fortiori, when they cannot) carry e-information about the objects they depict.
	But we contend that photographs are epistemically valuable in another way by also satisfying (2). In particular, photographs are epistemically valuable because they not only carry information and so provide evidence, but because they are typically recognizable as things that do.
	To see why, and why this is epistemically valuable, consider this analogy. Suppose you wish to learn about Fido not by looking at a photograph but by testimony from a human informant of whom you can ask exactly one question. There are three classes of available informants. Obvious-truth-tellers know the truth, report honestly when asked (so carry information about Fido), and are easily identified as Obvious-truth-tellers. Obvious-charlatans are unreliable reporters (they do not carry information) despite claiming to know the truth, and are easily identified as Obvious-charlatans. Finally, there are Ambiguous-reporters, some of whom carry information about Fido, some of whom do not, but are such that you cannot tell of one of them whether she does or does not. Whom should you ask?
	Surely not an Obvious-charlatan, since the report you would thereby obtain would not carry the information you seek. Should you ask an Ambiguous-reporter? Some Ambiguous-reporters—"informative Ambiguous-reporters"—carry the needed information. Your problem is that, when confronted with a particular Ambiguous-reporter, you have no way of knowing whether she is an informative or non-informative reporter. Therefore, even when face-to-face with an Ambiguous-reporter who happens to carry the desired information, you have no reason to believe this. You won't take her report to provide evidence, even if it does. In contrast, you will take the report of an Obvious-truth-teller to provide evidence. Obvious-truth-tellers are in this way more epistemically valuable than Ambiguous-reporters.
	Likewise if your source of evidence about Fido is a depictive representation. You will only take as evidence a representation that does carry information if it is recognizable to you as an instance of a type whose instances you believe carry information. That is, your disposition to accord evidential weight to a depictive representation is accounted for by its satisfying (2), rather than by its satisfying (1). Such depictive representations (including, we claim, photographs) are epistemically valuable in a way that those satisfying (1) alone are not.
	Cavedon-Taylor asks us to "consider a world whose inhabitants took photographs, but who simultaneously failed to treat such pictures as spatially-agnostic sources of v-information."​[4]​ He argues, and we concur, that photographs would possess some epistemic value in such a world. But this cannot show—as he seems to think it does—that viewers' attitudes toward photographs play no role in explaining the medium's epistemic value. For it is consistent with this that viewers' attitudes can contribute in some other important way to the overall epistemic value possessed by photographs. And that is precisely what we take to be the case.

3. Cavedon-Taylor suggests that that our account fails to recognize an actual intrinsic viewer-independent difference between photographs and veridical landscape paintings that would more simply capture the distinctive epistemic features of photographs. Namely, he claims that far fewer conditions must be satisfied in order for a photograph to be a spatially agnostic source of v-information than must be satisfied in order for a painting to be a spatially agnostic source of v-information. In the first place, Cavedon-Taylor is mistaken about the conditions that must be met in order for a painting to be a spatially agnostic source of v-information. For example, it is not the case that a painter's visual experiences "must be veridical" as Cavedon-Taylor claims.​[5]​ What is typically crucial is for the painter's visual experience to carry v-information. (Information-carrying is not, contrary to Cavedon-Taylor's gloss, equivalent to veridicality.) Even this may not be necessary. A painter may be able to correct for visual impairment by cognitive means.
	Perhaps more importantly, the claim about the relevant number of conditions that need to be satisfied in the two cases is far from obvious. True, the production of a v-information carrying painting requires some intentional conditions be met that are absent in the photographic case. But ordinary photographs won't carry v-information without the opening of a shutter, the subsequent closing of that shutter, the light-sensitivity of the film, the extraction of the film, the proper functioning of the developer, stop bath and fixer, a proper dark room, photography paper, and on and on. Might we save the suggestion by restricting ourselves to intentional conditions? Not if Snyder and Allen are right that the production of photographs is shot through with intentional conditions on the selection of lenses, the development process, etc.​[6]​
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